Consider a decision problem under uncertainty for a decision maker with known (utility) payoffs over prizes. We say that an act is Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli) rational if for some capacity (belief function, probability) over the set of states, it maximizes her``expected'' utility. We show that an act may be Choquet rational
INTRODUCTION
The Choquet expected utility (CEU) model was developed by Schmeidler [12] to explain a common pattern of behavior, the most striking instance of which is the well-known Ellsberg paradox [4] : The amount and quality of the information a decision maker (DM) has about the relevant events affects her preferences. In particular, DMs prefer to act on events they feel well-informed about, an attitude which has been called ambiguity aversion.
Schmeidler noticed that ambiguity aversion can be modelled by generalizing the standard subjective expected utility (SEU) model to allow the DM to have non-additive beliefs (called capacities). He also provided an axiomatic foundation and a mathematical representation, using a notion of expectation due to Choquet [21. A few years earlier, Dempster [3] and Shafer [13] developed the statistics of a special class of capacities, called belief functions, as a way to capture imprecise probabilities.
In this note, we consider a DM with known utility function over prizes facing a decision problem under uncertainty. We say say that an act is Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli) rational if for some capacity (belief function, probability) over the set of states, it maximizes her``expected'' utility. We show that an act may be Choquet rational without being Bernoulli rational, but it is Choquet rational if and only if it is Shafer rational. The proof of the latter result uses a novel representation of Choquet integrals as additive integrals on an expanded state space, which we believe of some separate technical interest.
As it is simple to characterize Shafer rational acts, our result can be of some use for the analysis of games in strategic form with CEU maximizing players: By using the characterization of Choquet rationality thus obtained we can define and characterize Choquet rationalizability, a generalization of the solution concept of Bernheim [1] and Pearce [10] . 2 
NOTATION AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider a finite space of states of the world 0 and a set of consequences /. The choice set F is a finite set of functions from 0 into /, that we call acts. A set-function & : 2 0 Ä R is called a (normalized) capacity if it satisfies the following conditions:
. A belief function (see Shafer [13] ) is a capacity that satisfies the additional condition (called total monotonicity): (3) for all n and all collections A 1 , ...,
where *I is the cardinality of set I. A capacity which satisfies (1) for pairs of sets (n=2) is called supermodular (convex, 2-monotonic). A probability is a set-function which satisfies (1) with equality for every collection of sets. Thus a probability is a belief function, but not vice versa. We let V be the set of all the capacities and V B be the (sub) set of all the belief functions on 0. For any finite set X, we denote by 2(X ) the set of the probability measures on (X, 2 X ). The Choquet integral with respect to & of a non-negative f: 0 Ä R is
where the integrals are taken in the sense of Riemann. It is easy to see that the Choquet integral is monotonic (that is, if f (|) g(|) for all | # 0 then for any capacity &, f d& g d&), and when 0 is finite it is also strictly
The DM has preferences p on F which are represented as follows: There exists a function u: X Ä R and a capacity & :
where the integrals are taken in the sense of Choquet. Since the utility function u is kept fixed throughout the analysis, we shall abuse notation and write f in place of u b f. That is, we henceforth treat acts as real-valued functions.
CHOQUET RATIONALITY
Suppose that a DM is facing Problem 1 (where the entries are utility payoffs) with 3Â2>=>0.
It is easy to see that if the DM chooses an act which maximizes expected utility with respect to additive beliefs P on 0, then she will not choose h. If, instead, the DM maximizes CEU with respect to a capacity, then h can be optimal. In fact, it maximizes CEU with respect to a belief function (for instance the``complete ignorance'' belief & which assigns weight 0 to either | 1 or | 2 and 1 to |). Since the DM perceives ambiguity (has poor information) about the states | 1 and | 2 , she prefers the``safe'' act h which assures her a payoff of = whatever happens to the other``risky'' acts. This shows that the CEU model admits predictions that are ruled out by SEU. To see this more precisely, notice that corresponding to whether the DM has beliefs represented by any capacity, a belief function, or a probability, we have three nested notions of rationality.
Definition 1. An act f * # F is called Choquet (resp. Shafer, resp. Bernoulli) rational if there exists a capacity (resp. belief function, resp. probability
Act f * is called Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli) dominated if it is not Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli) rational. Using game-theoretic terminology: Act f * is Choquet (Shafer, Bernoulli) rational if it is a best reply to some capacity (belief function, probability).
There is a very well known characterization of Bernoulli dominated acts (see [1] and [10] ): f is Bernoulli dominated if and only if it is strongly dominated, i.e., there is _ # 2(F"[ f ]) such that, for every | # 0,
It is simple to extend this result to provide a similar characterization of Shafer rational acts. 3 Clearly, the latter are also Choquet rational. Our main result establishes the converse.
DM's choice on a single set: The two types of preferences (or beliefs) can be distinguished if choices over different subsets of F can be observed.
3. REMARKS 3.1. We have seen that Choquet dominance is strictly weaker (rules out fewer acts) than strong (Bernoulli) dominance. Say that f is purely (strongly) dominated if there is a _ degenerate on some act h # F such that (3) holds. Choquet dominance is strictly stronger than pure dominance, as the monotonicity of Choquet integrals implies that a strategy which is purely dominated is Choquet dominated, while the converse is easily seen to be false.
3.2.
It follows from Theorem 1 that we obtain the same notion of rationality as long as we require the DM's beliefs to belong to any class of capacities containing the set V B . (This will be the case, for instance, if the DM is ambiguity averse in the sense of Schmeidler [12] or Ghirardato and Marinacci [7] .) K 3.3. A model different from CEU, which also allows ambiguity to matter in decision making is the maxmin expected utility (MEU) model of Gilboa and Schmeidler [8] . In MEU beliefs are represented by a nonempty closed and convex set of probabilities C, and an act f # F is evaluated via the functional
Schmeidler [12, Proposition] shows that the MEU and CEU are not nested, but they have a non-empty intersection corresponding to the case of CEU DMs with supermodular beliefs. That is, any such DM can be equivalently described by the two models.
By Theorem 1, every Choquet rational act can be``rationalized'' by a belief function, and by the observation just made a CEU DM with such beliefs also satisfies the MEU model. Hence, a Choquet rational act is`M EU rational'' (for a characterization, see Epstein [5] ). To see that the converse does not hold, consider Problem 2 (which is a modification of an example of Klibanoff in [9] ). Let C be the closed and convex class of probabilities on 0 defined as the convex hull of the probabilities N K&1). Given e # E consider the family A e , of subsets which are assigned weight 1 by e. Let B e , be the set of all the elements A e which are minimal with respect to set inclusion. That is,
Clearly the mapping e [ B e gives a bijection between the set E and the set B of all the classes B of subsets of 0 satisfying the property that if A, B # B, then both A"B{< and B"A{<. 
where we let B n =B e n and : n =:(&)(e n ).
Proof
To see why this is true, start by relabelling the elements of 0 so that
. Using the definition of the Choquet integral in (2) we have that
where l is the smallest integer such that e([| 1 , ...,
we only need to show that min
If that were not the case then there would be an A # B e such that A [| 1 , ..., | l&1 ], which is impossible by the definition of the index This concludes the proof of (5).
Using (5), it is immediate to obtain the additive decomposition in (4). Since V is the convex hull of E, for any & # V there is (at least one) vector
, satisfying : n (&) 0 for every n and n : n (&)=1, such that we can write &= n : n (&) e n . Clearly the vector :(&) can be extended to a probability on 2 E , which we will denote identically. Since the Choquet integral is linear in the integrating capacity to obtain
which is what we wanted to show. K
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Here we use the following property of belief functions (see [6] for details). Let Proof. We only need to prove that if f * is Choquet rational, then it is Shafer rational. Suppose that there is a capacity & such that for all f # F, 
Consider the following correspondence from E into N:
where the extension of every act in F to N is defined in Eq. (7), and let *: E Ä N be a selection from 4 (i.e., *(e) # 4(e) for all e # E). For every A # N, let E(A) be defined as follows:
E(A)#[e # E : A=*(e)].
(The identity of f * is relevant for that of E(A). For this reason, the + we construct depends on f *.) Consider now the number
e # E(A)
:(&)(e).
It is immediate to see that . From Eqs. (7), (6) , and (4) we have that for every f # F, For every f # F and e # E, max A # B e [ f *(A)] f (*(e)), and therefore we have 
